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I. Introduction
Economic and Social Planning - Aims and Methods
R.N. Vaughan
The questions which I slmll seek to answer here are the
following. What is economic planning and is there a need for such planning?
What are the essential components of a plan, and what are therefore the major
differences in the type of plans that may be proposed? May we learn anything
from the practical planning experience of other countries? In answering these
questions I propose to split up the discussion or~ the followLng lines -
In Section II,a planning framework is set out
In Section HI, tile relationship between macro-plans and certain investment
projects is considered.
Section IV examines the theory of indicative planning and the implementation of
//
such plans in France and Japan.
Finally, in Section V we discuss the problem of why some plans are successful,
whilst others fail.
In the title of this paper one may find the word "social"; I
intend to salve my conscience at this stage by saying that I intend to interpret
social as referring to the social impact of economic planning, and leave explicit
concern of problems of planning for the elderly, the sick and other such services
to the last speaker of this course.
I have aimed at an examination of what I believe to be the
essential components of any plan and an analysis of why plans in the free-market
economy turn out to be failures or successes. Subsequent speakers will talk
on particular aspects of the planning process, and on the planning experiences
in certain Countries¯
I am indebted to K.A. Kennedy for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
The views expressed here are, of course, not necessarily shared by Dr. Kennedy.
The essence of "economic planning" is that a central planning
body.first reviews the nation’s resources to ascertain what they are, and what
they should be. This body then attempts to influence the allocation of resources
both at macro- and micro-economic levels so as to maximize the welfare of the
nation.
The origin of the planning teclmiques applied today spring
from two main sources: Russian communist plannhlg and Western macro-planning.
Soviet planning was designed to guide in detail the production processes of a whole
country, taking advantage of a completely publicly owned productive apparatus,
and was based on a general background of Marxian ideas. At the time the communists
took over there did not exist any elaborate system of planning and it had to be built¯ ¯
up on the basis of practical experience, with some influence exerted by the experience
of military planning during the Fir st World War.
Western macroeconomic planning had its basis in the desire to
understand the fluctuating fortunes of the capitalist economies - given gu’eat impetus
by the Depression of the 1930’s. It.was highly influenced by the statistical concepts
relevant to national or social accounts, and by the ideas of Keynes. A basic
belief was held that many detailed decisions could and should be left to::the
decentralized system of single enterprises, and that guidance by the governrAent
should be confined to indirect intervention.
, llecently, influences have been at work to bring the two
systems somewhat closer together. Soviet planners have gone through a number
of experiences which have led them to think somewhat more in terms of macro-
variables and to accept some deoentralization. Westerners have been influenced
by the more detailed research methods involved in input-output analysis and the
possibilities created by better statistics and better computing machines.
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One notable connection between the evolution of the two systems
of planning, is that development has been in reponse to crises of one sort or another.
In the case of the Soviets, the trauma of the first world war and the subsequent
struggle s against the c om~ter-r evolutionaries made it nee e ssary to build an economy
capable of withstanding external threats. Hence the subsequent concentration on
heavy industries. In the Western case, modern plam~ng, as noted, received its
theoretical raison d’etre from the Keynesian arguments relating to the inability of
capitalism to be self-regulating; but perhaps of more practical import was the
influence of the Second World War, particularly the reconstruction phase of the
devastated economies .of Western Europe (and Japan).
Despite their different beginnings there are similarities between
Western and Soviet Plato]lag, and in the following sections we attempt to outline
the basic components of any plan, whatever its inspiration.
II The Planning Framework
/
Any plan of action, we may argue, may be broken down into
three essential components: (i) the objectives of the plan; (ii) the instruments
to be used in attaining those objectives; and (iii) the constraints on attaining the
objectives. These components apply not only to economic planning, but indeed
" to any problem in which an object is desired and intelligence is used to attain those
desires. Before considering the analysis of an economic plan in this manner, we may
consider the example of driving a car from point A to B. The objective of the plan is,
in this case, simply to arrive at point B. There may be additional objectives, e.g.
must arrive at B within six hours, say, of departure; must stop at point Cen route,
etc. The instruments to be used in this instance, are the controls of the car
accelerator, brake, clutch, steering wheel, etc. The constr.aints in this ca~ are the
technical specifications of the car, miles per gallon, acceleration capacity; the
inputs petrol, oil, etc. In addition, ihe car may be constrained to move only on
certain surfaces, i.e. restricted to roads, rather than moving across country; in
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addition we have external influences which likewise act as a constraint on the
driver obtaining objectives, these include the weather, and the behaviour of
other vehicles. In this case, given cognizance of the objectives, the instruments,
the constraints,the driver controls the car via the instruments to enable the car
to perform this particular feat. In the case of the management of the economy,
the objectives of the plan are measures such as the level and growth of national
!
income, the level of employment; the instruments utilised, fiscal and monetary
z"
policies, sanctions of law, purchasing power of the government; whilst constraints
on policy are e.g. the available resources of land, labour, and capital and the
attitudes of the community in regard to such ma~ters as living standards, life
style, etc. The objectives, instruments, and constraints of the economy will,
of course, differ as between countries; indeed the major difference between
Soviet and Western planning is -in relation to the instruments that are used
to pursue particular objectives; and this leads to a major classification of plans
according to type. Let us now turn to a listing of these elements in detail, and
/
the problems that occur m their formulaticn.
II. 1 The Objectives of a Plan
It would be ideal if the choice of one economic policy over
another could be evaluated in terms of a single goal that is well-established,
identified, and agreed upon. In’ fact, there are always many relevant planning
objectives. These are often conflicting,
made precise before decisions are made.
and the importance of each one is rarely
Public policy is often formulated on
the basis of a mostly qualitative integration of numerous economic, political,
social, and teclmologieal objectives. Explicit trade-offs between partially
complementary and conflicting o.bjectives are not always clear. This leads to
selection and implementation of plans which fail to meet many of the objectives
to the e;ktent originally envisaged.
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The following may be suggested as measures of objectives of
macro-economic planning.
(i) " National economic growth;
(ii)
(iii)
ely)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
Aggregate consumption;
Distribution of income;
Employment level;
Regional development;
Environmental quality;
Price stability.
When specified in macro-economic terms, these aims may,
however, be seen in certain cases to be somewhat amorphous, e.g. nationai
eutput is an aggregate of many types of goods, how is the distribution of income
to be measured? Are we content with improving the employment level, shouldn’t
the government be concerned with types of employment? How can a concept
such as environmental quality be measured? A second step would, thus, be
to disaggregate these objectives. Thus, objectives in employment levels may
be broken down into totals related to the demographic composition of the populaHon,
or to specific types of job; the aggregated consumption into particular categories
of goods; and environmental quality into particular measures of pollution in
named localities. Secondly, whilst the ultimate objective may be increases
in aggregate income and employment,an operational plan may be found in specifying
intermediate objectives. There is a saying that if you look after the pennies
i
the pounds will look after themselves. Thus, a catalogue of specific investment
projects with consequent employment consequences, may be started which will,
in itself, have consequences for employment, h~ this manner, governments
have also specified their objectives in terms of output of particular sectors,
believing that if such objectives are attained, then employment consequences
are beneficial.
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If the aims of the plan are complementary then no great
problems arise in formulating plan objectives, i.e. ff the objectives of a plan
were to increase aggregate consumption, investment, and employment, and these
varied directly with a measure of output of the economy - by working to increase
output the government is also working for the other objectives of the plan.
This may not usually be the case however, e.g. increases in GNP may Iead to a
decline in environmer~tal quality or to a worsening of the economic Status of
certain sectors of the community.
In the face of such conflicts between policy objectives, what
is the answer of the economist. Two possible ways out are as follows. First,
the planner may suggest to the policy-maker that he attach weights to particular
objectives, thus allowing the planner to trade-off so much employment against
so much output; output against pollution. This allows us to aggregate disparate
measures, e.g. employment in man-hours; output in value;" into one owrall
measure of benefit. However, such a measure implies agreement on the
weights, agreement in fact on an overall view of social welfareiagreement
which may be hard to find even among members of the same government. An
alternative method, is therefore to view certain objectives as constraints, e,g.
maximize output subject to unemployment not exceeding x %, subject to some
limits on the degree of inequality.
In discussing objectives, one thing is apparent that although
objectives are specified in quantitative terms we have not yet discussed their
actual quantitative levels¯ Should output growth be set at 3%, 6% per annum;
what should the unemployment level be? And indeed how should these quantitative
levels be set? There is possibly a fallacy that the plan is just a particular set
of quantitative targets and that a plan fails ff these are not met. However, the
quantitative targets cannot be sgt independently of the available instruments and
constraints on the economy, and such targets set are, of course, contingent
o]~ the numerical values included in the plan. Let us return to our car
analogy. Suppose the aim is to expand the economy at its highest possible
growth rate. An analogous problem for the car would be to drive the car as
far as possible in one day. Now to set a target of say 5% or 10% for the
economy without taking account of instruments or constraints, is equivalent
to setting out to drive from Dublin to Galway with half a gallon of petrol in
the tank, at 2.30 on Sunday morning, i.e. quantitative targets can only be
set with quantitative inputs into the instruments and constraint sector.
Secondly, we should not confuse the quantitative aspect of the plan, with the
plan itself; this is equivalent to confusing the art of driving a car, with the
particular speed with which one drives along a particular stretch of road;
that speed will vary depending on the weather,
of the road by other motorists. Accordingly,
the time of day, and the utilisation
the fallacy may have grown up
that because Ireland is a small open economy subject to variable extraneous
4
circumstances, planning is unsuited in sllch circumstances.
So such stress should not be placed on quantitative targets,
the values chosen are almost accidental at any particular time; what is important
is the art of driving the economy or car.
0
II. 2 The Instruments of the Plan
t
Having certain objectives in mind, the problem then arises
t
as to what methods the plalmer may use in achieving these objectives. The
list essentially catalogues the possible avenues of influence of the state on
individual persons and firms. All matters outside the influence of the state,
e.g. certain technological rel~{tionships between inputs and outputs, demand
by foreigners for domestically produced goods, may then be viewed as ’constraints.
A government can influence the national economy in several distinct ways:
-~
(i)
(ii)
{iii)
(iv)
(v)
Fiscal and monetary controls; e.g. taxation, government spending,
credit .controls.
Complete government control (not necessarily a direct one) over
certain sections of the economy, such as nationalisdtion of an
industry.
Legislation and government regulations with legal sanctions;
System of administrative controls where certain actions are
penalised and others rewarded, or where some actions are
subject to administrative permits.
Consultation with the business community and ’~ublic relations"
with the consumers, i.e. attempts to persuade the community to act
in aparticular way, e.g. "Save It", or "Buy Home Produce".
Thus the instruments of control are extremely numerous,
but can be dhqded into two broad categories:
Direct Controls: Where specific categories of economic enterprise
are ordered, permitted, or forbidden to take particular steps; and
Indirect Controls: Where the controlling body does not give direct
orders to the business community, but creates such a situaLion ill the
economy, e.g. by "fiscal and monetary controls that the community
will be induced to take a particular action because the altered market
conditions will render the old behaviour uneconomic.
This, in essence, is the distinction between plam~ing in
Eastern and Western countries. Western planners have attempted to induce
people to behave in a particular way, in essence by modifying the price system that
’rules in the economy, whilst Eastern planners rely on direct commands.
Instruments of Western planning arc thus essentially: (i) fiscal and monetary
controls; whilst Eastern bloc countries rely on (ii) where ownership of means
of production is in government hands. Of course, this is not a rigid distinction
there are rather varying shades between countries; all rely to some extent on
each of the five methods, One point that may be noted here is that a plan can
also become an instrument of policy - as we shall consider below.
II.3. The Constraints on the Plan
The third element of the plan are the constraints on the
system. This is something of a c~itch-all term. As we have noted, the
constraints are those aspects of the economy, variables and behavioural
relationships, which are not under the control of the government.
certain objectives may be written in as constraints on the system.
possible constraints the following may be delimited:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
In addition,
Among
Technological constraints - e.g. between required inputs and
output of a particular good.
Behavioural constraints - certain empirical regularities in the
way individuals spend their income has been noted e.g.
the proportion spent on food or housing. These are related to the
standard of living to which people have become accustomed.
Profitability constraints (in a capitalist system) - firms, over a
reasonable length of time, must work at a profit, otherwise they
will not remain in business. In order for aplan to be successful,
it mfist therefore ensure that profits are made.
Stock constraints - account must be taken of the existing
stocks of human and capital resources.
External balance constraints.
Objective corLstraints - ff certain objectives are transferred
to the constraint section.
II.4 The Costs of a Plan
We have outlined above a method for the analysis of an
economic plan; it is equally, of course, a procedure for developing a plan from
scratch. The development of such a plan however would require certain
inputs of information and skill, which cost money. A large literature exists
with regard to the method by which such a plan is constructed; the econometric
techniques which are used in the forecasting of the outputs of the various
sectors, the input-output method’s used in trying the various sectors together;
and the method of consultation between government, industry, and organised
labour to ensure cooperation in planning objectives.
¯
,....
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This leads us to the critical question of whether
, 
firstly, the
- construction of a workable plan is feasible,, given the necess~iry inputs of
information and qualified manpower; and secondly, ff feasible, do the
benefits outweigh the costs. Information is not free; there may be
difficulties in getting the firms to divulge information; there may even be
difficulty in getting the civil service to divulge information. There is also,
as you well know, a phenomenon in industry called increasing returns to scale,
whereby the cost of a product may fall as production expands. A similar
phenomenon occurs with the process of planning. The paperwork associated
with a plan may be nearly as great for a small as for a large country.
For small countries therefore the cost of plans of equal quality to those of
larger countries may constitute a real problem. In such circumstances
are there any ways in which the financial burden of planning may be eased.
The major costs of planning relate to the collection of information; and from
the above ana lys.is of an archetypal plan, the major new informational
demands would appear to be the nume’,’ical estimates of the constraints.
Virtually no new information is required with regard to the monitoring
of objectives, since such is already collected; neither with regard to
instruments, we may reasonably assume that those in use are measured by
the authorities. However, a study of planning experience in other conntries
may suggest that the actual ’raw data fed into the plan, and the numerical
projections that come out are the least important aspect of the plan; such
certainly appears to be the case in Japan, for example. Far more important
would appear to be the causal connections between instruments, constraints,
and objectives; i.e. knowledge of how a mixed economy works and the
¯ necessary stimuli, fiscal or otherwise, that need to be applied to ensure
certain bel~aviour on the part of firms and individuals. This analytic aspect of
..
the’plan perhaps surprisingly, is far cheaper to purchase than data; although
naturally, some data input is required. The benefits of a plan do not rest
only on the foward numerical projections made; but also on the appraisal
of past performance and the implications for policy.
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III, Macro-planning and Project.Analysis,
In discussing aspects of planning thus far we ha.ve concerned
ourselves with economy wide aspects, The next question we propose to
consider is the relation between such plans and particular investment pro-
jec~s. How disaggregative should the plan be? Should the plan concern
itself only with the main macro-economic indicators such as employment
and output; should it deal with particular sectora.1 outputs; or should it
concern itself with particular investment plans or projects. On the one hand,
it may be argued that as long as the government sets the general pattern of
economic development, tile evaluation and choice of particula, r projects can
be left to the private firms and individuals. However, .in thecase where
there is a public sector which undertakes investment, then naturally evaluation
and selection will devolve directly on the government. It can also be argued
that all, large projects, public and private, must be centrally scrutinized,
decided upon, and fitted into an investment programme, if government planning
is to have any meaning - a sound plan, it is maintained, requires a great deal
of knowledge about existing and potential projects. 1Realistic assumptions about
the level of investment which can be effectively carried out, and the connection
between this investment and output, presuppose a knowledge of the rate at which
good projects can be planned, designed, built, and brought to ca:pacify operation.
III. 1 Criteria for Project Selection
What then are the Criteria by which projects should be judged?
We shall approach this problem by first considering how a private profitability
analysis is conducted. The starting point of the analysis is to specify all the
expected inputs and outputs of the project, and to put a price on each. In this
way one arrives at anticipated expenditures and receipts. These will be spaced
over time from the inception of the plan to the economic demise of the projects.
It is now generally accepted that from the view of an enterprise, the best method
of thus combining the data is that known as "discounted cash flow" (DCF).
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The principle upon which DCF evaluations are based is that money has a
time value; £100 received now is worth more than a £100 received in a
year’s time, because it can beused.in the meantime to earn a r~turn. If
money can be invested at 10% p.a. then £121 received in two years’ time
can be said to have a ’present value’ of £100; the future sum being discounted
at the rate of 10% p.a. The discounting process is thus simply compound
interest worked backwards.
The first step is carrying out a DCF evaluation is then to
record year by year throughout the expected life of the project all expected
expenditure payments for goods and services for the project (including capital
expenditures) and all expected receipts from the project. For each year,
the subtraction of the former from the latter shows how much cash the firm
gains or loses as a result of the project. The second step is to discount
future cash flows back to the present. For this purpose the enterprise must
select a rate of discount. This is the rate of return which it deems prudent
to earn on its new investments, given the finar~eia[ conditions for obtaining cash
and the investment opportunities likely to be open to the firm in future years.
Thus, by the process of discounting,expenditures and receipts
which occur at different times throughout the construction and operation of the
project (and are to that extent incomparable) are all revalued to make them
comparable to present expenditures and receipts. They can then all be added up
to give asingle figure which is therefore named the present value (PV) of the
project. It comes to the same thing to subtract expenditures from receipts to
give a. net cash flow for each year and then discount these cash flows back to
,
the present - hence the term ’discounted cash flow’.
Further discussion of investment criteria may be found in Little and Mirrlees
(see references).
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It can also be useful to calculate a second measure of
profitability, the internal rate of return (IRR) - that is the ’yield’ of the
project. By definition this is the rate of discount which makes the present
value of a project zero. One reason for calculating the yield is that investors
are more used to judging their iavestments by yield rather than DCF. Another
reason is that the PV gives no indication’of whether a. project is close to the
margin of acceptability. Two projects may have the same PV, one being a,
large project with an IRR just above the discount rate, while the other is a
very small project with quite a high IRR. If the management is unsure of
its target rate of discount, then it is useful to have this information.
In general, when comparing prejects~those with the highest
PV or IRR should be chosen; but of course a modicum of common sense has
to be applied in using any criteria, and a perusal of the structure of the time .
streams of. costs and benefits is also a necessity.
III. 2 Social Project Selection
Let us consider the case of a project which has been .subjected
to private investment evaluation in the above manner; how would a public
investment appraisal of the same project differ.
The first point to note is that in private investment analysis
the costs and benefits of a project are evaluated at ruling market prices, or
rather at market prices as anticipated by the entrepreneur or investor. The
govermnent is not so constrained. In fact it may choose any set of prices to
evaluate a project. For instance, the government may take the view that
widespread unemployment denotes that the free market wage would be lower
than the ruling market wage.,, If ruling prices are t~ken to evaluate projects,
then there is a danger that projects will be chosen which will not reflect the
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true opportunity costs to the nation of the resources thereby utilised. The
government may thus choose to evaluate projects at what it believes to be
those prices which would lead to full utilization of the country’s resources.
Secondly, the discount rate may also be viewed as a market
price, and of course the government’s view of the correct social discount
rate for any project may differ from that of the market.’
Thirdly, differences may occur in the particular stream of
costs and benefits when viewed from a social rather than private point of view.
An example:is the firm which omits to count the cost to society of pollutants
which it emits in to the environment, which would be taken into account in a.
social cost benefit analysis.
Given the possible disjunction between social and private
evaluations of particular projects, what courses of action are open to the
government if it sees what in its opinion are misuses of resou~-ces in the
selection of projects. Firstly, it can itself initiate projects or directly
inhibit certain investments through’the use of licences and other such measures.
Secondly, it can attempt to influence project selection through varying the pric3
variables that enter into private investment appraisal, - either by fiscal
or monetary means.
IV. Types of Planning
Evidently, from the many possible permutations of objectives,
instruments and constraints, a wide variety of plans may issue. However, it
is usual to attempt to categorise plans according to the instruments used in
their implementation. The ina jor distinction is between what have come to
be’termed "indicative" plans, and those that have been termed "imperative".
This distinction can be exemplified by the position that governments of different
persuasion would take with regard to the disjunction of social and private
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evaluations of particular investment projects noted above. Imperative
planning would entail direct action, initiation of projects, licences etc.
Indicative planning would .attempt to influence the environment i.n which
investment decisions are made. We propose to concentrate here on this
latter type of planning; we briefly outline the theory behind indicative
planningI and then go on to consider two particular examples, planning in
in France and Japan.
IV. 1. Indicative Planning
An interesting aspect of indicative planning, or so the story
runs, is that by the mere act of planning, the planitself becomes an instru-
ment for its own fulfillment, what has been termed the "annocneement"
effect. The theory of indicative planning thus rests on the assumption
that a published forecast is different from an unpublished one; the plan
itself influences expectations and publication thus changes the forecast that
would otherwise be made. There is thus an aspect of the economy attempting
to lift itself by its bootstraps. The government has a plan for ..
faster growth - the main instrument of government policy to ensure this growth
is the plan itself, via its influence on expectations and uncertainty. In a
decentralised market economy, expectations are generated and held by
individual economic agents and there is no way in which differing expectations
can be reconciled ex ante. Firm’s investment plans, for example, must be
based on forecasts of future demand and cost Conditions. In the absence of a
mchanism for securing ex ante consistency, one of two things will happen.
Firms which over-estimate future demand at the going price and invest
accordingly will find thatsupply exceeds demand and the price will fall, if
prices are flexible; or, if prices, are not flexible, some of the new capacity
will remain unused; in either case, profits will be lower than expected. Firms
which under-estimate future demand will find either that- prices rise or that
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q’ueueing develops. Profits will be abnormally high in the firstcase and
lower than they could have been in the second. On the conventional analysis,
if demand remains at its new level, these mistakes will tend to be eliminated,
either bY a change in the rate of investment or by the entry and exit of firms
from the industry. But in the interim, the system will clearly be less
efficient if these mistakes could have been avoided ex ante rather than
repaired ex post.
The information which the firm needs if ex ante consistency
is to be achieved is of two kinds, relating on the one hand to demand for the
product of the industry, and oll the other to the volume of competitive supply
from the other firms in the industry. An indicative plan attempts to provide
both kinds of information: the first by essentially an exploration of the
industrial input-output implications of the gJ.ob~l output target, the second
by an industrial survey which attempts to add up the supply pla.ns of the firms
in each industry. The confrontation of the two, and the consequential revisions
of plans, is it is claimed the crucial step in avoiding inefficiency.
.
So much for the theory of indicative planning; however, there
is rarely a case where the government of a country has relied solely on the
"announcement" effect of a plan. France and Japan are usually referred to as
the countries with"indicative" planning, .however in these countries the
"announcement" effects of the plan are also supplemented by various instru-
ments of direct and indirect government intervention. I now propose to
discuss briefly plans which have been implemented in these countries.
A discussion of the theory of indicative planning may be found in Meade,
(see references).
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iV.2 Planning in France
France has now had thirty years of continuous economic
planning. So great was the devastation of France by the time of liberation
in 1944 that detailed government control of the programme of reconstruction
was clearly needed. Thirty years later Plan 6 (1971-75) has drawn to a close
and Plan 7 (1976-80) has now begun. The concept of economic planning has
changed enormously over the intervening years. Originally, there was a
simple programme giving priority to the economy’s ’basic sectors’.- coal,
steel, farm machinery, electricity, transport and cement - but now the
planning exercise has mushroomed into a complex integration of all major
expenditure, whether social or economic, in both the public and the private
sectors. Early plans were rather narrowly economic and industrial in
character, but successive plans have widened their approach to embrace
more social, demographic and regional aspects and to make long-term pro-
visions for future years. Once the government has indicated its general
order of priorities, most of the detailed preparatory work is done by a series
of ’vertical commissions’ - one for each major sector, such as agriculture,
housing, transport- and ’horizontal commissions’ - one for employment,
one for finance. The preparation of a Plan from inception to final completion ’
now takes over four years, so that.work on Plan 8, which will take effect in
1981, begins this year.
The first plan (1947-53) focussed on the reconstruction of a
few key sectors. Very little data were available and the plan was little more
than the aggregation of the investment plans of the nationalised industries.
In addition to a concerted investment component (as in the first plan), it
attempted to cover the rest of industry too. The third plan (1958-61)’
contained few innovations, merely a technically better version of the second
plan. The fourth plan (1962-65) was the one that attracted major international
attention. It contained very detailed physical output projections and made a
:
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first attempt (as far as the plan was concerned) at social investment
programmes. The key features were the establishment of d.emand
expectations, the role of plantargets in the application of these, and the
apparent self-fulfilling nature of the plan which came about through the
involvement of industry in its preparation.
Following the fourth plan, the French replaced the
emphas~ on the demand expectation approach, by placing greater attention
on the promotior/of industrial competition, particularly international
competition, and the removal of factors which impede it. The growing
importance of prices and exports focussed attention on increasing productivity
and lowering costs.
Industrial policy was a key component, developed and
strengthened in the fifth and sixth plans. In the fifth, the emphasis was
placed on allowing firms sufficient profit margins to finance investment
and on changing the size of firms to promote more efficient production
units. The plan contained a number of sector programmes and to aid
their implementation ’programme contracts’ were introduced in July 1966.
These were agreements between firms and the government that, for the period
of the plan, firms would be allowed to raise their prices (in order to finance
investment) provided they compiled with the plan’s objectives on output,
investment and exports. Agreements were signed in a number of sectors:
steel, electronic computers, merchant vessel construction, cars and
electrical appliances. These were not all with single firms; in some cases,
the industry’s trade association was party to the agreement.
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The sixth plan’s industrial policy can be discussed under
three headings: first, there are measures to remove legnl and other
barriers to competition. Secondly, ttlerc are improvements in the
environment of industry - a doubl.ing of the capacity for training and
retraining labour; more flexible arrangements for obtaining medium and
long-term funds; -guaranteed government expenditure on roads, ports and
telecommunications, specifically to assist industry, as well as more public "
expenditure on research and dev.elopment. Thirdly, there are the criteria
[o guide government action, characterized .by ’help the strong, not the
weak’. These criteria are to consolidate firms in which France has a
strong position in the market; to accelerate the decline of marginal firms;
to provide financial assistance to dynamic firms; to encourage the creation
of new firms likely to diffuse technological innovations rapidly; to encourage
French firms to invest abroad; and to provide special assistance to primary
sectors.
The new plans are, therefore, on a particularly selective
basis The full range of instruments of French industrial policy are not
particularly novel. Looking first at general ~_nstruments, there are direct
and indirect measures. The direct instruments including building permits
t
in Paris, annual price agreements negotiated between the government and
trade associations or sometimes single firms, and the distribution of
government economic forecasts, particularly to firms involved in government
eontracts.
Indirect measures include policies aimed at influencing
the environment in which industry operates, rather than industry itself -
budget policy, government contracts, savings policy, monetary policy,
general taxation.
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Moving on to specific policy instruments. We may
note three which have attracted particular attention. First, "there are
programme contracts negotiated between the government and nationalised
industries. Secondly, financial support to medium-sized firms for a
liinited period. Thirdly, a whole battery of financial and fiscal incentives.
They include grants proportional to investment and employment. They also
include "contracts" as noted above, i.e. agreements relating to prices
.
conditional on certain courses of action of the firm.
Although guidelines for wage rises have been laid down
in the plans, these have not always been adhered to. If wages and consequer,~!y
costs thus get out of line with France’s major competitors, the government
has used devaluation as an appropriate policy response. We may note that
the largest union in France, the Confederation Generale du Travail, is
communist dominated and will not participate in negotiations leading to
control on incomes.
IV. 3 Planning in Japan
The role of the government in Japan’s growth process has
been a matter of some dispute. The image of a centrally directed "Japan Inc."
in which the government in close consultation with business virtually determines
the allocation of resources among productive activities is certainly overdrawn.
At the same time, the government does place the highest priority on rapid
economic growth and on the expansion of exports, acting as a lubricator and
stimulator of this pro’cess. Its five-year projections have served as targets
In.guiding business decision making and in addition to maeroeconomic policies
aimed at full employment and price stability, it has adopted a coordinated set
Elaboration of the points noted above may be found in Liggins, (see references).
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of microeconomic policies designed to accelerate structural change in favour of
promising high growth sectors. Historically, the Japanese government has. taken
an active interest in economic planning’. At the end of the nineteenth century
Japan was a poor weak country with little in the way of industry, technology,
or natural resources. To maintain her independence, her leaders felt compelled
to catch up with the West; for both military and economic reasons, industrialisation
was a necessity. This step resulted in early government involvement in promoting
indust~’.y and early development of close relations "beLween government and business;
e.g. the government imported and set up modern textile mills which were later
sold ~o private enterprise.
.The official planning period in Japan has varied. Some plans have
been officially announced for a period of ten years - the "Doubling the National
Income Plan 1961-1970" - or for five years e.g. the "Economic and Social
Development Plan", 1967-71". The planners frankly admit that any plan is
essentially an extension of past trends and relationships and will accordingly
have predictive power for only a very brief time after the period on which the
calculations are based. Because of this fact as soon as a plan is constructed
work starts on adjusting the data and even the conceptual basis of the predictions.
If the private sector’s performance deviates from the plan it is the plan which
will be given the push; a new plan will then be prepared; thus we have.a system
of "rolling plans", the planners accepting the latest trends as starting points.
Although it has been stated that the execution of the Japanese
plans rests sole~7 on its announcement effects, it would be a mistake not to note
that the government has made extensive use of policy instruments, as noted above.
At the end of World War II Japan was confronted with the need for rapid industrialisatio~:
and substantial economic develQpment. Economic growth required high rates
of investment and export promotion if capacity was to be expanded rapidly and
imports were to be fimqnced. But Japan’s capital stock was small and only the
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banks had the necessary funds. Therefore the government, through the Bank
of Japan encouraged the debt financing required for high investment rates. In
addition, tax reforms continually altered the progressive nature of Japan’s
income tax to favour capital accumulation and high savings rates. Interest income
was taxed at lower rates than was salary income, and capital gnins were often
nottaxed at all. Companies also received favourable tax and interest rate
benefits for exports. The programme was particularly successful because it
favoured those firms that grew fastest and were effective exporters. The fastest
growing firms used the most debt and received the most tax benefits; they
could thus price lower relative to competitors and achieve the same return on
equity, even if costs were the same. They could then undersell competitors
both domestically and overseas. As their volume increased, their unit costs
become lower and they could further lower prices, grow faster, and benefit
from government tax policies. Conversely, slow growing firms had to repay
loans and deferred taxes. The government itself favoured private investment
over public investment. The government consistently underestimated grc.wth
rates and thus fiscal revenues. Budget surpluses were then returned to the
private sector via tax cuts. The cost of this growth was underinvestment in
public facilities and high rates of industrial investment instead of personal
.
consumption.                                 "
High debt levels thus fostered competition. Japanese managers
became accustomed to rapid growth and ~o realize the adverse consequences
of failing to grow with the market; they invested heavily in anticipation of demand.
As investments were uneven, temporary excess capacity developed; but since
fixed costs were high (all labour costs viewed as fixed in Japan since the firm
offers employment for life; also high interest charges), little can be gained by
not working at capacity. Prices are very’flexible downward, leading to extreme
price competitiveness and rapid industry shakeouts of the luckless firms. The
Analysis of plmming in Japan may be found in Bieda and Frank, (see references).
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"government’s policies in effect accelerated the impact of internal forces on
Japan’s development. Economic gro.wth increases incomes, labour skills,
capital stock,
expectations.
and mpply shifts.
and technical sophistication; and further raises consumer
Japan’s high growth policies accelerated these demand
.V. Why Plans Succeed or Fail
From experience of planning in other countries, what
are the major points to be noted as to the reasons for the success or failure
of plans.
1. Firstly, we believe planning has succeeded where it has
ensured that it is in the interests of the private citizens to follow the plan.
Successful planning prescribes a course of action that is in their long-term
interest to follow. The carrot which ensures that private entrepreneurs stick
to the path laid out for them by-the government is, of course, profit. Deviation
from the path will lead to lower profits. Thus, the planners do not push against
the pressures that are inherent in a capitalist system, but manipulate these
pressures to the advantage of what the planners believe to be the benefit of the
society as a whole.
2. Secondly, we have the realisation that planning cannot be only
considered in physical terms; i.e. a plan which delineates physical targets,
for the whole economy or particular sectors will not be attained unless account
is also taken of the prices of inputs and the price at which the output can be
sold. Thus, in a capitalist economy, ff planned outputs are to be actualised
then certainly it must be profitable to operate at these levels.
l
o
however,
Early planning in France emphasised demand conditions,
there has recently been a greater emphasis on supply conditions.
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This always appears to have been true with regard to Japahese planning. The
primary force generating growth is not domestic demand expansion, but price
cutting relative to major competitors - the aim is to expand your share of the
market for particular products irrespective of the growth in the total market.
4.                The emphasis on a particular list of projects to be under-
taken. Particular projects add concreteness to any development plan. Such
a strategy is more evident in Japan, and the projects delineated were simply
those that had previously been undertaken in more developed countries. Thus,
major industries were targeted as growth opportunities based on previous
European or U.S. experience.
5.                Discouragement of foreign direct control of industrial enter-
prise. This should not be seen as an example of national chauvinism but
as an acute awareness of the dangers inherent in what may be termed
"subsidiarlsation". When a firm sets up as subsidiary in a particular country,
then that subsidiary will not compete with the parent company. Thus, in
the case of Japan e.g. one wouldnot expect to find such penetration of the
American or European markets by Japanese cars ff the Japanese auto industry
were controlled by Americans or Europeans. If the latter were true, the
subsidiaries would be content with supplying the Japanese domestic market
and the countries on the periphery of Japan. "Subsidiarisation" costs jobs.
As an aside, the Irish government may take note, for example, of developments
in the Irish food and confectionery industries, and certain restrictive trade
agreements that act as barriers to the expansion of these industries.
6. We have the widespread use of monetary and financial
lnstl:uments to engender a favourable climate for growth. Only by such
influence over the banking sector could, e.g. the policy of debt financing
required for high investment rates be pursued.
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7. We may note that the pIans have been pursued in Japan and
France without a.n effective incomes o~: wage policy. In France, as noted,
although guidelines for Wage rises have been laid down these have not always
been adhered to. In Japan’s private sector, unionisa.tion has been on an
enterprise basis, although there has been recent movement towards centralisation.
Wage-bargaining has therefore been on a firm-by-firm basis. The success of
the firm has usually been identified with the success of the employee. If a
firm goes out of business, the worker may lose his priveleged "permanent"
status and become a. "temporary" worker in another enterprise. Wage-rates
are thus set in line with productiv.ity gains and to ensure that the firms costs
do not appreciate in excess of its competit.ors which would lead to a decline
in the firm’s market share.
8. Although preferring to leave the development of enterprise in
private hands, in the absence of entt’epreneurial drive in a particular direction,
the state has been prepared to initiate its own projects. Such policies were
particularly evident in the early development of Japan.
9. There is an advantage in preparing the groundwork for plans
well in advance, andfor a continual planning and monitoring process. The initial
French and Japanese plans were modest affairs," and thus relatively cheap;
they were later expanded as expertise in planning accumulated.
10. With respect to the instruments that the Japanese and French
have utilised, there are none that are not already in the hands of the Irish
govermnent. Emphasis may, however, be drawn to the particular planning
agreements made between firms and the government, e.g. such may make
price increases conditional on inv.estment plans being undertaken. The possible
stabilisation of output through an Industrial Marketing Board may also be noted.
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11. The use of policy instruments to directly stimulate growth
cannot be overemphasised. Firms which do not grow are simply pe,m.Iised
through the use of fiscal instruments. Such mechanisms speed up the capitalist
process; in studying the Japanese economy one derivcs the impression that the
planners and government economic ministers have digested their Marx very
thoroughly; in much the same way as s police manual can be put to good effect
by criminal elements. ’ ’
Now, I have stressed the role of profit in the planning process,
and have stated the belief that French and Japan.ese plans have succeeded for
the major reason that they have ensured that it is profitable for firms to accede
to the plan; indeed that only by acceding to the government guidelines can they
eventually stay in business. Planning by this method appears to beparticula.rly
brutal, no "lame ducks" (at least where "lance ducks" have a strong domestic
bi:other).    Perhaps, in studying the more genteel planning of the Scandinavian
countries a different answer may have emerged. However, unless foreign
businessmen have a great sense of social responsibility and run their businesses as
philanthropic enterprises, using the carrot of profits would appear to be the only
way of ensuring voluntary compliance with the plan. I would be interested to hear
of any counter-examples from a capitalist country.
Now such implications may appear disturbing to trade unionists
or socialists. May not this view of planning simply be seen as a method of
appeasing the capitalist class. The argument may continue that we require
socialist planning, planning that will ensure a greater equity in the distribution
of goods produced by society, that will ensure continuity of employment and
better employment prospects for our children. There does appear to be a
dilemma here. One could, of course, argue that increased profits, provided
they are invested, lead to greater employment and a better future life. Increased
profits also may lead to greater inequalities in the distribution of income and
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wealth. As long as we are constrained to work within a community in which
production is not socially held, then the only answer would appear to be wider
distribution of shareholdings. The trade unions themselves could initiate
such a process. One should also remember that as long as the only method of
transport is a donkey and cart, to feed the donkey a carrot now and again need
not denote any particular love for the beast.
I have, thus far, avoided discussion of the specific problems
facing the Irish economy; however, to conclude I will make a, few points which
may initiate future discussion, and which relate to points noted above.
First, two well-known analyses of the Irish economy. The
Irish economy has traditionally been one with a surplus of labour and shortage
of capital. This problem has been accentuated by the relative success of the
Irish eco,lomy in the past deca.de, in that people who would have left did not,
and their children, and children’s children are now coming along. Ireland is,
therefore, faced with the prospect of a rapidly expanding labour force. To
provide jobs for these people, the government must, therefore, raise the rate
of investment to provide more capital and thus more jobs. Parallel to this
argument that capital-scarcity is the major cause of long-run unemployment,
we have the shorter-run Keynesian demand-deficiency argument allied to the balance-
of-payments constraint. Unemployment arises’ because there is insufficient
demand for the country’s products. The government cannot increase demand,
because such expansion would suck in extra, imports, and such imports cannot be
financed by further borrowing from abroad. However, it can be argued that,
though these theories have elements of truth, they have deeper roots related
to the price and cost structure of the Irish economy. Firstly, the argument
concerning the shortage of capital. It seems rather inappropriate to blame
capital deficiency for unemployment at a time when firms are not at present
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working at capacity; even before the current depression there would a.ppear
to have been great under-utilisation of the existing capital stock. With re~ard
to demand-deficiency, there are arguments that assert that Ireland’s sh~’tre
of overseas markets are so small, there would be no difficulty in expanding
this share¯ Further, there appears to be great import penetration of the Irish
market by foreign firms; if there is a demand deficiency why can foreign firms
sell similsr products so successfully? In both cases, the reason may be
found in the cost. structure; capital is not used intensively because manufacturers
find it not profitable to do so; Irish firms do not expand their sales in
domestic and foreign markets not because there is no demand for products,
but again because of profitability. Tackle supply and not the demand problem
is, therefore, the call to Irish planners; if policies are advanced to expand
domestic demand, the results will be that the market for foreign compeLitors
will be increased whilst domestic output and employment will show no marked
change.
We are again back at the problems which have attracted so
much attention in both Japanese and French plans; the question of supply price.
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